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Nightwatch Cybersecurity

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When security vulnerabilities are discovered by researchers, proper reporting channels are often lacking. As a result, vulnerabilities may be left unreported. This document defines a machine-parsable format ("security.txt") to help organizations describe their vulnerability disclosure practices to make it easier for researchers to report vulnerabilities.

Status of This Memo This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are candidates for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at .

Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents () in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

• .  Introduction
  • .  Motivation, Prior Work, and Scope
  • .  Terminology
• .  The Specification
  • .  Comments
  • .  Line Separator
  • .  Digital Signature
  • .  Extensibility
  • .  Field Definitions
    • .  Acknowledgments
    • .  Canonical
    • .  Contact
    • .  Encryption
    • .  Expires
    • .  Hiring
    • .  Policy
    • .  Preferred-Languages
  • .  Example of an Unsigned "security.txt" File
  • .  Example of a Signed "security.txt" File
• .  Location of the security.txt File
  • .  Scope of the File
• .  File Format Description and ABNF Grammar
• .  Security Considerations
  • .  Compromised Files and Incident Response
  • .  Redirects
  • .  Incorrect or Stale Information
  • .  Intentionally Malformed Files, Resources, and Reports
  • .  No Implied Permission for Testing
  • .  Multi-User Environments
  • .  Protecting Data in Transit
  • .  Spam and Spurious Reports
• .  IANA Considerations
  • .  Well-Known URIs Registry
  • .  Registry for security.txt Fields
• .  References
  • .  Normative References
  • .  Informative References
• Acknowledgments
• Authors' Addresses

Introduction

Motivation, Prior Work, and Scope Many security researchers encounter situations where they are unable to report security vulnerabilities to organizations because there are no reporting channels to contact the owner of a particular resource, and no information is available about the vulnerability disclosure practices of such owner. As per , there is an existing convention of using the <SECURITY@domain> email address for communications regarding security issues. That convention provides only a single, email-based channel of communication per domain and does not provide a way for domain owners to publish information about their security disclosure practices. There are also contact conventions prescribed for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in , for Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) in , and for site operators in . As per , there is also contact information provided by Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) and domain registries for owners of IP addresses, Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs), and domain names. However, none of these tackle the issue of how security researchers can locate contact information and vulnerability disclosure practices for organizations in order to report vulnerabilities. In this document, we define a richer, machine-parsable, and more extensible way for organizations to communicate information about their security disclosure practices and ways to contact them. Other details of vulnerability disclosure are outside the scope of this document. Readers are encouraged to consult other documents such as or . As per , "vulnerability response" refers to reports of product vulnerabilities, which is related to but distinct from reports of network intrusions and compromised websites ("incident response"). The mechanism defined in this document is intended to be used for the former ("vulnerability response"). If implementors want to utilize this mechanism for incident response, they should be aware of additional security considerations discussed in . The "security.txt" file is intended to be complementary and not a substitute or replacement for other public resources maintained by organizations regarding their security disclosure practices.

Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. The term "researcher" corresponds to the terms "finder" and "reporter" in and . The term "organization" corresponds to the term "vendor" in and . The term "implementors" includes all parties involved in the vulnerability disclosure process.

The Specification This document defines a text file to be placed in a known location that provides information about vulnerability disclosure practices of a particular organization. The format of this file is machine parsable and MUST follow the ABNF grammar defined in . This file is intended to help security researchers when disclosing security vulnerabilities. By convention, the file is named "security.txt". The location and scope are described in . This text file contains multiple fields with different values. A field contains a "name", which is the first part of a field all the way up to the colon (for example: "Contact:") and follows the syntax defined for "field-name" in . Field names are case insensitive (as per ). The "value" comes after the field name (for example: "mailto:security@example.com") and follows the syntax defined for "unstructured" in . The file MAY also contain blank lines. A field MUST always consist of a name and a value (for example: "Contact: mailto:security@example.com"). A "security.txt" file can have an unlimited number of fields. Each field MUST appear on its own line. Unless otherwise specified by the field definition, multiple values MUST NOT be chained together for a single field. Unless otherwise indicated in a definition of a particular field, a field MAY appear multiple times. Implementors should be aware that some of the fields may contain URIs using percent-encoding (as per ).

Comments Any line beginning with the "#" (%x23) symbol MUST be interpreted as a comment. The content of the comment may contain any ASCII or Unicode characters in the %x21-7E and %x80-FFFFF ranges plus the tab (%x09) and space (%x20) characters. Example: # This is a comment.

Line Separator Every line MUST end with either a carriage return and line feed characters (CRLF / %x0D %x0A) or just a line feed character (LF / %x0A).

Digital Signature It is RECOMMENDED that a "security.txt" file be digitally signed using an OpenPGP cleartext signature as described in . When digital signatures are used, it is also RECOMMENDED that organizations use the "Canonical" field (as per ), thus allowing the digital signature to authenticate the location of the file. When it comes to verifying the key used to generate the signature, it is always the security researcher's responsibility to make sure the key being used is indeed one they trust.

Extensibility Like many other formats and protocols, this format may need to be changed over time to fit the ever-changing landscape of the Internet. Therefore, extensibility is provided via an IANA registry for fields as defined in . Any fields registered via that process MUST be considered optional. To encourage extensibility and interoperability, researchers MUST ignore any fields they do not explicitly support. In general, implementors should "be conservative in what you do, be liberal in what you accept from others" (as per ).

Field Definitions Unless otherwise stated, all fields MUST be considered optional.

Acknowledgments The "Acknowledgments" field indicates a link to a page where security researchers are recognized for their reports. The page being referenced should list security researchers that reported security vulnerabilities and collaborated to remediate them. Organizations should be careful to limit the vulnerability information being published in order to prevent future attacks. If this field indicates a web URI, then it MUST begin with "https://" (as per ). Example: Acknowledgments: https://example.com/hall-of-fame.html Example security acknowledgments page: We would like to thank the following researchers: (2017-04-15) Frank Denis - Reflected cross-site scripting (2017-01-02) Alice Quinn - SQL injection (2016-12-24) John Buchner - Stored cross-site scripting (2016-06-10) Anna Richmond - A server configuration issue

Canonical The "Canonical" field indicates the canonical URIs where the "security.txt" file is located, which is usually something like "https://example.com/.well-known/security.txt". If this field indicates a web URI, then it MUST begin with "https://" (as per ). While this field indicates that a "security.txt" retrieved from a given URI is intended to apply to that URI, it MUST NOT be interpreted to apply to all canonical URIs listed within the file. Researchers SHOULD use an additional trust mechanism such as a digital signature (as per ) to make the determination that a particular canonical URI is applicable. If this field appears within a "security.txt" file and the URI used to retrieve that file is not listed within any canonical fields, then the contents of the file SHOULD NOT be trusted. Canonical: https://www.example.com/.well-known/security.txt Canonical: https://someserver.example.com/.well-known/security.txt

Contact The "Contact" field indicates a method that researchers should use for reporting security vulnerabilities such as an email address, a phone number, and/or a web page with contact information. This field MUST always be present in a "security.txt" file. If this field indicates a web URI, then it MUST begin with "https://" (as per ). Security email addresses should use the conventions defined in . The value MUST follow the URI syntax described in . This means that "mailto" and "tel" URI schemes must be used when specifying email addresses and telephone numbers, as defined in and . When the value of this field is an email address, it is RECOMMENDED that encryption be used (as per ). These SHOULD be listed in order of preference, with the first occurrence being the preferred method of contact, the second occurrence being the second most preferred method of contact, etc. In the example below, the first email address ("security@example.com") is the preferred method of contact. Contact: mailto:security@example.com Contact: mailto:security%2Buri%2Bencoded@example.com Contact: tel:+1-201-555-0123 Contact: https://example.com/security-contact.html

Encryption The "Encryption" field indicates an encryption key that security researchers should use for encrypted communication. Keys MUST NOT appear in this field. Instead, the value of this field MUST be a URI pointing to a location where the key can be retrieved. If this field indicates a web URI, then it MUST begin with "https://" (as per ). When it comes to verifying the authenticity of the key, it is always the security researcher's responsibility to make sure the key being specified is indeed one they trust. Researchers must not assume that this key is used to generate the digital signature referenced in . Example of an OpenPGP key available from a web server: Encryption: https://example.com/pgp-key.txt Example of an OpenPGP key available from an OPENPGPKEY DNS record: Encryption: dns:5d2d37ab76d47d36._openpgpkey.example.com?type=OPENPGPKEY Example of an OpenPGP key being referenced by its fingerprint: Encryption: openpgp4fpr:5f2de5521c63a801ab59ccb603d49de44b29100f

Expires The "Expires" field indicates the date and time after which the data contained in the "security.txt" file is considered stale and should not be used (as per ). The value of this field is formatted according to the Internet profiles of and as defined in . It is RECOMMENDED that the value of this field be less than a year into the future to avoid staleness. This field MUST always be present and MUST NOT appear more than once. Expires: 2021-12-31T18:37:07z

Hiring The "Hiring" field is used for linking to the vendor's security-related job positions. If this field indicates a web URI, then it MUST begin with "https://" (as per ). Hiring: https://example.com/jobs.html

Policy The "Policy" field indicates a link to where the vulnerability disclosure policy is located. This can help security researchers understand the organization's vulnerability reporting practices. If this field indicates a web URI, then it MUST begin with "https://" (as per ). Example: Policy: https://example.com/disclosure-policy.html

Preferred-Languages The "Preferred-Languages" field can be used to indicate a set of natural languages that are preferred when submitting security reports. This set MAY list multiple values, separated by commas. If this field is included, then at least one value MUST be listed. The values within this set are language tags (as defined in ). If this field is absent, security researchers may assume that English is the language to be used (as per ). The order in which they appear is not an indication of priority; the listed languages are intended to have equal priority. This field MUST NOT appear more than once. Example (English, Spanish and French): Preferred-Languages: en, es, fr

Example of an Unsigned "security.txt" File # Our security address Contact: mailto:security@example.com # Our OpenPGP key Encryption: https://example.com/pgp-key.txt # Our security policy Policy: https://example.com/security-policy.html # Our security acknowledgments page Acknowledgments: https://example.com/hall-of-fame.html Expires: 2021-12-31T18:37:07z

Example of a Signed "security.txt" File -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 # Canonical URI Canonical: https://example.com/.well-known/security.txt # Our security address Contact: mailto:security@example.com # Our OpenPGP key Encryption: https://example.com/pgp-key.txt # Our security policy Policy: https://example.com/security-policy.html # Our security acknowledgments page Acknowledgments: https://example.com/hall-of-fame.html Expires: 2021-12-31T18:37:07z -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.2 [signature] -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Location of the security.txt File For web-based services, organizations MUST place the "security.txt" file under the "/.well-known/" path, e.g., https://example.com/.well-known/security.txt as per of a domain name or IP address. For legacy compatibility, a "security.txt" file might be placed at the top-level path or redirect (as per ) to the "security.txt" file under the "/.well-known/" path. If a "security.txt" file is present in both locations, the one in the "/.well-known/" path MUST be used. The file MUST be accessed via HTTP 1.0 or a higher version, and the file access MUST use the "https" scheme (as per ). It MUST have a Content-Type of "text/plain" with the default charset parameter set to "utf-8" (as per ). Retrieval of "security.txt" files and resources indicated within such files may result in a redirect (as per ). Researchers should perform additional analysis (as per ) to make sure these redirects are not malicious or pointing to resources controlled by an attacker.

Scope of the File A "security.txt" file MUST only apply to the domain or IP address in the URI used to retrieve it, not to any of its subdomains or parent domains. A "security.txt" file MAY also apply to products and services provided by the organization publishing the file. As per , this specification is intended for a vulnerability response. If implementors want to use this for an incident response, they should be aware of additional security considerations discussed in . Organizations SHOULD use the policy directive (as per ) to provide additional details regarding the scope and details of their vulnerability disclosure process. Some examples appear below: # The following only applies to example.com. https://example.com/.well-known/security.txt # This only applies to subdomain.example.com. https://subdomain.example.com/.well-known/security.txt # This security.txt file applies to IPv4 address of 192.0.2.0. https://192.0.2.0/.well-known/security.txt # This security.txt file applies to IPv6 address of 2001:db8:8:4::2. https://[2001:db8:8:4::2]/.well-known/security.txt

File Format Description and ABNF Grammar The file format of the "security.txt" file MUST be plain text (MIME type "text/plain") as defined in and MUST be encoded using UTF-8 in Net-Unicode form . The format of this file MUST follow the ABNF definition below (which incorporates the core ABNF rules from and uses the case-sensitive string support from ). body = signed / unsigned unsigned = *line (contact-field eol) ; one or more required *line (expires-field eol) ; exactly one required *line [lang-field eol] *line ; exactly one optional ; order of fields within the file is not important ; except that if contact-field appears more ; than once, the order of those indicates ; priority (see Section 3.5.3) ; signed is the production that should match the OpenPGP clearsigned ; document signed = cleartext-header 1*(hash-header) CRLF cleartext signature cleartext-header = %s"-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----" CRLF hash-header = %s"Hash: " hash-alg *("," hash-alg) CRLF hash-alg = token ; imported from RFC 2045; see RFC 4880 Section ; 10.3.3 for a pointer to the registry of ; valid values ;cleartext = 1*( UTF8-octets [CR] LF) ; dash-escaped per RFC 4880 Section 7.1 cleartext = *((line-dash / line-from / line-nodash) [CR] LF) line-dash = ("- ") "-" *UTF8-char-not-cr ; MUST include initial "- " line-from = ["- "] "From " *UTF8-char-not-cr ; SHOULD include initial "- " line-nodash = ["- "] *UTF8-char-not-cr ; MAY include initial "- " UTF8-char-not-dash = UTF8-1-not-dash / UTF8-2 / UTF8-3 / UTF8-4 UTF8-1-not-dash = %x00-2C / %x2E-7F UTF8-char-not-cr = UTF8-1-not-cr / UTF8-2 / UTF8-3 / UTF8-4 UTF8-1-not-cr = %x00-0C / %x0E-7F ; UTF8 rules from RFC 3629 UTF8-octets = *( UTF8-char ) UTF8-char = UTF8-1 / UTF8-2 / UTF8-3 / UTF8-4 UTF8-1 = %x00-7F UTF8-2 = %xC2-DF UTF8-tail UTF8-3 = %xE0 %xA0-BF UTF8-tail / %xE1-EC 2( UTF8-tail ) / %xED %x80-9F UTF8-tail / %xEE-EF 2( UTF8-tail ) UTF8-4 = %xF0 %x90-BF 2( UTF8-tail ) / %xF1-F3 3( UTF8-tail ) / %xF4 %x80-8F 2( UTF8-tail ) UTF8-tail = %x80-BF signature = armor-header armor-keys CRLF signature-data armor-tail armor-header = %s"-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----" CRLF armor-keys = *(token ": " *( VCHAR / WSP ) CRLF) ; Armor Header Keys from RFC 4880 armor-tail = %s"-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----" CRLF signature-data = 1*(1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "=" / "+" / "/") CRLF) ; base64; see RFC 4648 ; includes RFC 4880 checksum line = [ (field / comment) ] eol eol = *WSP [CR] LF field = ; optional fields ack-field / can-field / contact-field / ; optional repeated instances encryption-field / hiring-field / policy-field / ext-field fs = ":" comment = "#" *(WSP / VCHAR / %x80-FFFFF) ack-field = "Acknowledgments" fs SP uri can-field = "Canonical" fs SP uri contact-field = "Contact" fs SP uri expires-field = "Expires" fs SP date-time encryption-field = "Encryption" fs SP uri hiring-field = "Hiring" fs SP uri lang-field = "Preferred-Languages" fs SP lang-values policy-field = "Policy" fs SP uri date-time = < imported from Section 5.6 of [RFC3339] > lang-tag = < Language-Tag from Section 2.1 of [RFC5646] > lang-values = lang-tag *(*WSP "," *WSP lang-tag) uri = < URI as per Section 3 of [RFC3986] > ext-field = field-name fs SP unstructured field-name = < imported from Section 3.6.8 of [RFC5322] > unstructured = < imported from Section 3.2.5 of [RFC5322] > token = < imported from Section 5.1 of [RFC2045] > ALPHA = %x41-5A / %x61-7A ; A-Z / a-z BIT = "0" / "1" CHAR = %x01-7F ; any 7-bit US-ASCII character, ; excluding NUL CR = %x0D ; carriage return CRLF = CR LF ; Internet standard newline CTL = %x00-1F / %x7F ; controls DIGIT = %x30-39 ; 0-9 DQUOTE = %x22 ; " (Double Quote) HEXDIG = DIGIT / "A" / "B" / "C" / "D" / "E" / "F" HTAB = %x09 ; horizontal tab LF = %x0A ; linefeed LWSP = *(WSP / CRLF WSP) ; Use of this linear-white-space rule ; permits lines containing only white ; space that are no longer legal in ; mail headers and have caused ; interoperability problems in other ; contexts. ; Do not use when defining mail ; headers and use with caution in ; other contexts. OCTET = %x00-FF ; 8 bits of data SP = %x20 VCHAR = %x21-7E ; visible (printing) characters WSP = SP / HTAB ; white space "ext-field" refers to extension fields, which are discussed in .

Security Considerations Because of the use of URIs and well-known resources, security considerations of and apply here, in addition to the considerations outlined below.

Compromised Files and Incident Response An attacker that has compromised a website is able to compromise the "security.txt" file as well or set up a redirect to their own site. This can result in security reports not being received by the organization or being sent to the attacker. To protect against this, organizations should use the "Canonical" field to indicate the locations of the file (as per ), digitally sign their "security.txt" files (as per ), and regularly monitor the file and the referenced resources to detect tampering. Security researchers should validate the "security.txt" file, including verifying the digital signature and checking any available historical records before using the information contained in the file. If the "security.txt" file looks suspicious or compromised, it should not be used. While it is not recommended, implementors may choose to use the information published within a "security.txt" file for an incident response. In such cases, extreme caution should be taken before trusting such information, since it may have been compromised by an attacker. Researchers should use additional methods to verify such data including out-of-band verification of the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) signature, DNSSEC-based approaches, etc.

Redirects When retrieving the file and any resources referenced in the file, researchers should record any redirects since they can lead to a different domain or IP address controlled by an attacker. Further inspection of such redirects is recommended before using the information contained within the file.

Incorrect or Stale Information If information and resources referenced in a "security.txt" file are incorrect or not kept up to date, this can result in security reports not being received by the organization or sent to incorrect contacts, thus exposing possible security issues to third parties. Not having a "security.txt" file may be preferable to having stale information in this file. Organizations must use the "Expires" field (see ) to indicate to researchers when the data in the file is no longer valid. Organizations should ensure that information in this file and any referenced resources such as web pages, email addresses, and telephone numbers are kept current, are accessible, are controlled by the organization, and are kept secure.

Intentionally Malformed Files, Resources, and Reports It is possible for compromised or malicious sites to create files that are extraordinarily large or otherwise malformed in an attempt to discover or exploit weaknesses in the parsing code. Researchers should make sure that any such code is robust against large or malformed files and fields, and they may choose to have the code not parse files larger than 32 KBs, those with fields longer than 2,048 characters, or those containing more than 1,000 lines. The ABNF grammar (as defined in ) can also be used as a way to verify these files. The same concerns apply to any other resources referenced within "security.txt" files, as well as any security reports received as a result of publishing this file. Such resources and reports may be hostile, malformed, or malicious.

No Implied Permission for Testing The presence of a "security.txt" file might be interpreted by researchers as providing permission to do security testing against the domain or IP address where it is published or against products and services provided by the organization publishing the file. This might result in increased testing against an organization by researchers. On the other hand, a decision not to publish a "security.txt" file might be interpreted by the organization operating that website to be a way to signal to researchers that permission to test that particular site or project is denied. This might result in pushback against researchers reporting security issues to that organization. Therefore, researchers shouldn't assume that the presence or absence of a "security.txt" file grants or denies permission for security testing. Any such permission may be indicated in the company's vulnerability disclosure policy (as per ) or a new field (as per ).

Multi-User Environments In multi-user / multi-tenant environments, it may be possible for a user to take over the location of the "security.txt" file. Organizations should reserve the "security.txt" namespace at the root to ensure no third party can create a page with the "security.txt" AND "/.well-known/security.txt" names.

Protecting Data in Transit To protect a "security.txt" file from being tampered with in transit, implementors MUST use HTTPS (as per ) when serving the file itself and for retrieval of any web URIs referenced in it (except when otherwise noted in this specification). As part of the TLS handshake, researchers should validate the provided X.509 certificate in accordance with and the following considerations:

• Matching is performed only against the DNS-ID identifiers.
• DNS domain names in server certificates MAY contain the wildcard character '*' as the complete leftmost label within the identifier.

The certificate may also be checked for revocation via the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) , certificate revocation lists (CRLs), or similar mechanisms. In cases where the "security.txt" file cannot be served via HTTPS (such as localhost) or is being served with an invalid certificate, additional human validation is recommended since the contents may have been modified while in transit. As an additional layer of protection, it is also recommended that organizations digitally sign their "security.txt" file with OpenPGP (as per ). Also, to protect security reports from being tampered with or observed while in transit, organizations should specify encryption keys (as per ) unless HTTPS is being used for report submission. However, the determination of validity of such keys is out of scope for this specification. Security researchers need to establish other secure means to verify them.

Spam and Spurious Reports Similar to concerns in , denial-of-service attacks via spam reports would become easier once a "security.txt" file is published by an organization. In addition, there is an increased likelihood of reports being sent in an automated fashion and/or as a result of automated scans without human analysis. Attackers can also use this file as a way to spam unrelated third parties by listing their resources and/or contact information. Organizations need to weigh the advantages of publishing this file versus the possible disadvantages and increased resources required to analyze security reports. Security researchers should review all information within the "security.txt" file before submitting reports in an automated fashion or reports resulting from automated scans.

IANA Considerations Implementors should be aware that any resources referenced within a "security.txt" file MUST NOT point to the Well-Known URIs namespace unless they are registered with IANA (as per ).

Well-Known URIs Registry IANA has updated the "Well-Known URIs" registry with the following additional values (using the template from ):

URI suffix:

security.txt

Change controller:

IETF

Specification document(s):

RFC 9116

Status:

permanent

Registry for security.txt Fields IANA has created the "security.txt Fields" registry in accordance with . This registry contains fields for use in "security.txt" files, defined by this specification. New registrations or updates MUST be published in accordance with the "Expert Review" guidelines as described in Sections and of . Any new field thus registered is considered optional by this specification unless a new version of this specification is published. Designated experts should determine whether a proposed registration or update provides value to organizations and researchers using this format and makes sense in the context of industry-accepted vulnerability disclosure processes such as and . New registrations and updates MUST contain the following information:

1. Name of the field being registered or updated
2. Short description of the field
3. Whether the field can appear more than once
4. New or updated status, which MUST be one of the following:

   current:

   The field is in current use.

   deprecated:

   The field has been in use, but new usage is discouraged.

   historic:

   The field is no longer in current use.

5. Change controller
6. The document in which the specification of the field is published (if available)

Existing registrations may be marked historic or deprecated, as appropriate, by a future update to this document. The initial registry contains these values:

Field Name:

Acknowledgments

Description:

link to page where security researchers are recognized

Multiple Appearances:

yes

Status:

current

Change controller:

IETF

Reference:

RFC 9116

Field Name:

Canonical

Description:

canonical URI for this file

Multiple Appearances:

yes

Status:

current

Change controller:

IETF

Reference:

RFC 9116

Field Name:

Contact

Description:

contact information to use for reporting vulnerabilities

Multiple Appearances:

yes

Status:

current

Change controller:

IETF

Reference:

RFC 9116

Field Name:

Expires

Description:

date and time after which this file is considered stale

Multiple Appearances:

no

Status:

current

Change controller:

IETF

Reference:

RFC 9116

Field Name:

Encryption

Description:

link to a key to be used for encrypted communication

Multiple Appearances:

yes

Status:

current

Change controller:

IETF

Reference:

RFC 9116

Field Name:

Hiring

Description:

link to the vendor's security-related job positions

Multiple Appearances:

yes

Status:

current

Change controller:

IETF

Reference:

RFC 9116

Field Name:

Policy

Description:

link to security policy page

Multiple Appearances:

yes

Status:

current

Change controller:

IETF

Reference:

RFC 9116

Field Name:

Preferred-Languages

Description:

list of preferred languages for security reports

Multiple Appearances:

no

Status:

current

Change controller:

IETF

Reference:

RFC 9116

References Normative References This second document defines the general structure of the MIME media typing system and defines an initial set of media types. [STANDARDS-TRACK] In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. This specification enumerates and describes Internet mail addresses (mailbox name @ host reference) to be used when contacting personnel at an organization. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document is the current policies being applied by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) towards the standardization efforts in the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in order to help Internet protocols fulfill these requirements. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. This document defines a date and time format for use in Internet protocols that is a profile of the ISO 8601 standard for representation of dates and times using the Gregorian calendar. ISO/IEC 10646-1 defines a large character set called the Universal Character Set (UCS) which encompasses most of the world's writing systems. The originally proposed encodings of the UCS, however, were not compatible with many current applications and protocols, and this has led to the development of UTF-8, the object of this memo. UTF-8 has the characteristic of preserving the full US-ASCII range, providing compatibility with file systems, parsers and other software that rely on US-ASCII values but are transparent to other values. This memo obsoletes and replaces RFC 2279. This document specifies the URI (Uniform Resource Identifier) scheme "tel". The "tel" URI describes resources identified by telephone numbers. This document obsoletes RFC 2806. [STANDARDS-TRACK] A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact sequence of characters that identifies an abstract or physical resource. This specification defines the generic URI syntax and a process for resolving URI references that might be in relative form, along with guidelines and security considerations for the use of URIs on the Internet. The URI syntax defines a grammar that is a superset of all valid URIs, allowing an implementation to parse the common components of a URI reference without knowing the scheme-specific requirements of every possible identifier. This specification does not define a generative grammar for URIs; that task is performed by the individual specifications of each URI scheme. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document is maintained in order to publish all necessary information needed to develop interoperable applications based on the OpenPGP format. It is not a step-by-step cookbook for writing an application. It describes only the format and methods needed to read, check, generate, and write conforming packets crossing any network. It does not deal with storage and implementation questions. It does, however, discuss implementation issues necessary to avoid security flaws. OpenPGP software uses a combination of strong public-key and symmetric cryptography to provide security services for electronic communications and data storage. These services include confidentiality, key management, authentication, and digital signatures. This document specifies the message formats used in OpenPGP. [STANDARDS-TRACK] The Internet today is in need of a standardized form for the transmission of internationalized "text" information, paralleling the specifications for the use of ASCII that date from the early days of the ARPANET. This document specifies that format, using UTF-8 with normalization and specific line-ending sequences. [STANDARDS-TRACK] Internet technical specifications often need to define a formal syntax. Over the years, a modified version of Backus-Naur Form (BNF), called Augmented BNF (ABNF), has been popular among many Internet specifications. The current specification documents ABNF. It balances compactness and simplicity with reasonable representational power. The differences between standard BNF and ABNF involve naming rules, repetition, alternatives, order-independence, and value ranges. This specification also supplies additional rule definitions and encoding for a core lexical analyzer of the type common to several Internet specifications. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document specifies the Internet Message Format (IMF), a syntax for text messages that are sent between computer users, within the framework of "electronic mail" messages. This specification is a revision of Request For Comments (RFC) 2822, which itself superseded Request For Comments (RFC) 822, "Standard for the Format of ARPA Internet Text Messages", updating it to reflect current practice and incorporating incremental changes that were specified in other RFCs. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document describes the structure, content, construction, and semantics of language tags for use in cases where it is desirable to indicate the language used in an information object. It also describes how to register values for use in language tags and the creation of user-defined extensions for private interchange. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. This document defines the format of Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) to identify resources that are reached using Internet mail. It adds better internationalization and compatibility with Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs; RFC 3987) to the previous syntax of 'mailto' URIs (RFC 2368). [STANDARDS-TRACK] Many application technologies enable secure communication between two entities by means of Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) certificates in the context of Transport Layer Security (TLS). This document specifies procedures for representing and verifying the identity of application services in such interactions. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document specifies a protocol useful in determining the current status of a digital certificate without requiring Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). Additional mechanisms addressing PKIX operational requirements are specified in separate documents. This document obsoletes RFCs 2560 and 6277. It also updates RFC 5912. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document provides an overview of HTTP architecture and its associated terminology, defines the "http" and "https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes, defines the HTTP/1.1 message syntax and parsing requirements, and describes related security concerns for implementations. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless \%application- level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document defines the semantics of HTTP/1.1 messages, as expressed by request methods, request header fields, response status codes, and response header fields, along with the payload of messages (metadata and body content) and mechanisms for content negotiation. This document extends the base definition of ABNF (Augmented Backus-Naur Form) to include a way to specify US-ASCII string literals that are matched in a case-sensitive manner. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. This memo defines a path prefix for "well-known locations", "/.well-known/", in selected Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes. In doing so, it obsoletes RFC 5785 and updates the URI schemes defined in RFC 7230 to reserve that space. It also updates RFC 7595 to track URI schemes that support well-known URIs in their registry. Informative References Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University, CMU/SEI-2017-SR-022 ISO ISO ISO This handbook is a guide to developing computer security policies and procedures for sites that have systems on the Internet. The purpose of this handbook is to provide practical guidance to administrators trying to secure their information and services. The subjects covered include policy content and formation, a broad range of technical system and network security topics, and security incident response. This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. The purpose of this document is to express what the engineering community as represented by the IETF expects of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) with respect to security. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. WHOIS output objects from registries, including both Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) and Domain Name Registries (DNRs), were collected and analyzed. This document describes the process and results of the statistical analysis of existing WHOIS information. The purpose of this document is to build an object inventory to facilitate discussions of data objects included in Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) responses. Many protocols make use of points of extensibility that use constants to identify various protocol parameters. To ensure that the values in these fields do not have conflicting uses and to promote interoperability, their allocations are often coordinated by a central record keeper. For IETF protocols, that role is filled by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). To make assignments in a given registry prudently, guidance describing the conditions under which new values should be assigned, as well as when and how modifications to existing values can be made, is needed. This document defines a framework for the documentation of these guidelines by specification authors, in order to assure that the provided guidance for the IANA Considerations is clear and addresses the various issues that are likely in the operation of a registry. This is the third edition of this document; it obsoletes RFC 5226.

Acknowledgments The authors would like to acknowledge the help provided during the development of this document by , , , , , , , and . The authors would also like to acknowledge the feedback provided by multiple members of the IETF's LAST CALL, SAAG, and SECDISPATCH lists. would like to also thank L.T.S. (for everything).

Authors' Addresses

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Nightwatch Cybersecurity

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